Agents get hijacked
Hostile instructions hide in documents, emails, tickets, web pages, PDFs and Slack.
By default, an agent obeys them.
AI & agent security
Prompt injection is still unsolved. Once an agent can act inside internal systems, weak guardrails become a direct path to compromise.
We help teams assess, design, test and harden AI agent systems.
Talk to usTrusted with critical software by NASA, Boeing, the Ethereum Foundation, Solana and Stellar since 2010.
Hostile instructions hide in documents, emails, tickets, web pages, PDFs and Slack.
By default, an agent obeys them.
Give an agent access to tools, credentials and production systems, and prompt injection stops being a content problem.
It becomes an authorization failure.
A compromised agent can leak data, delete files, expose secrets, send messages and run unsafe code.
Common assumption
Reality
We review the design, map the attack surface, run light adversarial testing, and find where the agent has unsafe permissions, weak boundaries or behaviour your engineers never intended.
You get a concise report with findings rated by severity, and a prioritized plan for what to fix next.
Teams already building, piloting or deploying agents
We design stronger control layers around what the agent is allowed to do:
The result is an agent that is harder to hijack, harder to misuse and easier to trust.
Teams moving from prototype to production
Our engineers bring a barrage of adversarial techniques, fuzzing strategies, hostile inputs, malicious context and tool-abuse cases to find out whether your guardrails actually hold.
The result is evidence of where the system breaks, while you still have time to change it.
Teams that need confidence before a launch, an enterprise review or a wider rollout
Agent security moves too quickly to treat as a one-time checklist. We stay available as models, tools and attack techniques change:
Teams that want expert backup while they keep shipping
Our work is designed for companies building, deploying or adopting AI agents before they have an internal AI security team.
“The question is not whether the model sounds safe. It is whether the system around it enforces what must never happen.”
That is a formal methods question. We specify the properties a system must hold and prove the code holds them, and we bring the same discipline to agents.
Let us find the weak points first.
Talk to us about your agents